The Mahabharata
  Srimad Bhagavatam

  Rig Veda
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  Bhagavad Gita
  Sankara Bhashya
  By Edwin Arnold

  Brahma Sutra
  Sankara Bhashya I
  Sankara Bhashya II
  Ramanuja SriBhashya


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  Brahma Sutras

Ramanujacharya's Brahma Sutra Bhashya translated By George Thibaut
SriBhashya - Ramanuja's Commentary On Brahma Sutra (Vedanta Sutra)

Sri Bhashya (also spelled as Sri Bhasya) is a commentary of Ramanujacharya on the Brama Sutras (also known as Vedanta Sutras) of Badarayana. In this bhashya, Ramanuja presents the fundamental philosophical principles of Visistadvaita based on his interpretation of the Upanishads, Bhagavad-gita and other smrti texts. In his Sri-bhashya he describes the three categories of reality (tattvas): God, soul and matter, which have been used by the later Vaisnava theologians including Madhva. The principles of bhakti as a means to liberation were also developed.

23. And in the case of space also, on account of there being no difference.

In order to prove the permanency of external and internal things, we have disproved the view that the two forms of destruction called pratisankhyâ and apratisankhyâ mean reduction of an existing thing to nothing. This gives us an opportunity to disprove the view of Ether(space) being likewise a mere irrational non-entity, as the Bauddhas hold it to be. Ether cannot be held to be a mere irrational non-entity, because, like those things which are admitted to be positive existences, i.e. earth, and so on, it is proved by consciousness not invalidated by any means of proof. For the formation of immediate judgments such as 'here a hawk flies, and there a vulture,' implies our being conscious of ether as marking the different places of the flight of the different birds. Nor is it possible to hold that Space is nothing else but the non-existence (abhâva) of earth, and so on; for this view collapses as soon as set

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forth in definite alternatives. For whether we define Space as the antecedent and subsequent non-existence of earth, and so on, or as their mutual non-existence, or as their absolute non-existence--on none of these alternatives we attain the proper idea of Space. If, in the first place, we define it as the antecedent and subsequent non-existence of earth, and so on, it will follow that, as the idea of Space can thus not be connected with earth and other things existing at the present moment, the whole world is without Space.

If, in the second place, we define it as the mutual non-existence of earth, and so on, it will follow that, as such mutual non-existence inheres in the things only which stand towards each other in the relation of mutual non-existence, there is no perception of Space in the intervals between those things(while as a matter of fact there is). And, in the third place, absolute non-existence of earth, and so on, cannot of course be admitted. And as non-existence (abhâva) is clearly conceived as a special state of something actually existing, Space even if admitted to be of the nature of abhâva, would not on that account be a futile non-entity (something 'tukkha' or 'nirupâkhya').

24. And on account of recognition.

We return to the proof of the, previously mooted, permanence of things. The 'anusmriti' of the Sûtra means cognition of what was previously perceived, i.e. recognition. It is a fact that all things which were perceived in the past may be recognised, such recognition expressing itself in the form 'this is just that (I knew before).' Nor must you say that this is a mere erroneous assumption of oneness due to the fact of the thing now perceived being similar to the thing perceived before, as in the case of the flame (where a succession of flames continually produced anew is mistaken for one continuous flame); for you do not admit that there is one permanent knowing subject that could have that erroneous idea. What one person has perceived, another cannot judge to be the same as, or similar to, what he is perceiving himself. If therefore you hold that there is an erroneous

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idea of oneness due to the perception of similarity residing in different things perceived at different times, you necessarily must acknowledge oneness on the part of the cognising subject. In the case of the flame there is a valid means of knowledge to prove that there really is a succession of similar flames, but in the case of the jar, we are not aware of such a means, and we therefore have no right to assume that recognition is due to the similarity of many successive jars.---Perhaps you will here argue as follows. The momentariness of jars and the like is proved by Perception as well as Inference. Perception in the first place presents as its object the present thing which is different from non-present things, in the same way as it presents the blue thing as different from the yellow; it is in this way that we know the difference of the present thing from the past and the future. Inference again proceeds as follows--jars and the like are momentary because they produce effects and have existence (sattva); what is non-momentary, such as the horn of a hare, does not produce effects and does not possess existence. We therefore conclude from the existence of the last momentary jar that the preceding jar-existences also are perishable, just because they are momentary existences like the existence of the last jar.--But both this perception and this inference have already been disproved by what was said above about the impossibility of momentary existences standing to one another in the relation of cause and effect. Moreover, that difference of the present object from the non-present object which is intimated by Perception does not prove the present object to be a different thing (from the past object of Perception),but merely its being connected with the present time. This does not prove it to be a different thing, for the same thing can be connected with different times. The two reasons again which were said to prove the momentariness of jars are invalid because they may be made to prove just the contrary of what they are alleged to prove. For we may argue as follows--From existence and from their having effects it follows that jars, and so on, are permanent; for whatever is non-permanent, is non-existent, and does

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not produce effects, as e.g. the horn of a hare. The capacity of producing effects can in fact be used only to prove non-momentariness on the part of jars, and so on; for as things perishing within a moment are not capable of acting, they are not capable of producing effects. Further, as it is seen in the case of the last momentary existence that its destruction is due to a visible cause (viz. the blow of a hammer or the like), the proper conclusion is that also the other momentary jars (preceding the last one) require visible causes for their destruction; and(as no such causes are seen, it follows that)the jar is permanent and continuous up to the time when a destructive cause, such as the blow of a hammer, supervenes. Nor can it be said that hammers and the like are not the causes of destruction, but only the causes of the origination of a new series of momentary existences dissimilar to the former ones--in the case of the jar, e.g. of a series of momentary fragments of a jar; for we have proved before that the destruction of jars, and so on, means nothing but their passing over into a different condition, e.g. that of fragments. And even if destruction were held to be something different from the origination of fragments, it would yet be reasonable to infer, on the ground of immediate succession in time, that the cause of the destruction is the blow of the hammer.

Hence it is impossible to deny in any way the permanency of things as proved by the fact of recognition. He who maintains that recognition which has for its object the oneness of a thing connected with successive points of time has for its objects different things, might as well say that several cognitions of, let us say, blue colour have for their object something different from blue colour. Moreover, for him who maintains the momentariness of the cognising subject and of the objects of cognition, it would be difficult indeed to admit the fact of Inference which presupposes the ascertainment and remembrance of general propositions. He would in fact not be able to set forth the reason required to prove his assertion that things are momentary; for the speaker perishes in the very moment when he states the proposition to be proved, and another person is unable to

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complete what has been begun by another and about which he himself does not know anything.

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