Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the soul, when passing out of the body at the time of death, remains invested with the subtle material elements (bhûtasûkshma) which serve as an abode to the prânas attached to the soul.
Adhik. II (8-11) shows that, when the souls of those who had enjoyed the reward
of their good works in the moon descend to the earth in order to undergo a new
embodiment, there cleaves to them a remainder (anusaya) of their former
deeds which determines the nature of the new embodiment.
Adhik. III (12-21) discusses the fate after death of those whom their good works do not entitle to pass up to the moon.
Adhik. IV, V, VI (22; 23; 24-27) teach that the subtle bodies of the souls descending from the moon through the ether, air, &c., do not become identical with ether, air, &c., but only like them; that the entire descent occupies a short time only; and that, when the souls finally enter into plants and so on, they do not participate in the life of the latter, but are merely in external contact with them.
Adhik. I (1-6) treats of the soul in the dreaming state. According to Sankara the three first Sûtras discuss the question whether the creative activity ascribed to the soul in some scriptural passages produces things as real as those by which the waking soul is surrounded, or not; Sûtra 3 settles the point by declaring that the creations of the dreaming soul are mere 'Mâyâ,' since they do not fully manifest the character of real objects. Sûtra 4 adds that dreams, although mere Mâyâ, yet have a prophetic quality. Sûtras 5 and 6 finally reply to the question why the soul, which after all is a part of the Lord and as such participates in his excellencies, should not be able to produce in its dreams a real creation, by the remark that the soul's knowledge and power are obscured by its connexion with the gross body.
The considerably diverging interpretation given of this adhikarana by
Râmânuga has the advantage of more closely connecting the
Sûtras with each other. According to him the question is not whether the
creations of a dream are real or not, but whether they are the work of the individual
soul or of the Lord acting within the soul. Sûtras 1 and 2 set forth the
pûrvapaksha. The creations of dreams (are the work of the individual soul);
for thus Scripture declares: 'And the followers of some sâkâs
declare (the soul to be) a creator,' &c. The third Sûtra states the
siddhânta view: 'But the creations of dreams are Mâyâ, i.
e. are of a wonderful nature (and as such cannot be effected by the individual
soul), since (in this life) the nature (of the soul) is not fully manifested.'
Concerning the word 'mâyâ,' Râmânuga remarks,
'mâyâsabdo hy âskaryavâkî
ganakasya kule gâtâ devamâyeva nirmitâ
ityâdishu tathâ darsanât.' The three remaining Sûtras
are exhibited in the Srî-bhâshya in a different order, the
fourth Sûtra, according to Sankara, being the sixth according
to Râmânuga. Sûtras 4 and 5 (according to Râmânuga's
numeration) are explained by Râmânuga very much in the same
way as by Sankara; but owing to the former's statement of the
subject-matter of the whole adhikarana they connect themselves more intimately
with the preceding Sûtras than is possible on Sankara's
interpretation. In Sûtra 6 (sûkakas kâ
hi) Râmânuga sees a deduction from the siddhânta of
the adhikarana, 'Because the images of a dream are produced by the highest
Lord himself, therefore they have prophetic significance.'
Adhik. II teaches that in the state of deep dreamless sleep the soul abides within Brahman in the heart.
Adhik. III (9) expounds the reasons entitling us to assume that the soul awakening from sleep is the same that went to sleep.--Adhik. IV (9) explains the nature of a swoon.
Adhik. V (11-21) is, according to Sankara, taken up with the
question as to the nature of the highest Brahman in which the individual soul
is merged in the state of deep sleep. Sûtra 11 declares that twofold characteristics
(viz. absence and presence of distinctive attributes, nirviseshatva and
saviseshatva) cannot belong to the highest Brahman even through its stations,
i.e. its limiting adjuncts; since all passages which aim at setting forth Brahman's
nature declare it to be destitute of all distinctive attributes.--The fact,
Sûtra 12 continues, that in many passages Brahman is spoken of as possessing
distinctive attributes is of no relevancy, since wherever there are mentioned
limiting adjuncts, on which all distinction depends, it is specially stated
that Brahman in itself is free from all diversity; and--Sûtra 13 adds--in
some places the assumption of diversity is specially objected to.--That Brahman
is devoid of all form (Sûtra 14), is the pre-eminent meaning of all Vedânta-texts
setting forth Brahman's nature.--That Brahman is represented as having different
forms, as it were, is due to its connexion with its (unreal) limiting adjuncts;
just as the light of the sun appears straight or crooked, as it were, according
to the nature of the things he illuminates (15).--The Brihadâranyaka
expressly declares that Brahman is one uniform mass of intelligence (16); and
the same is taught in other scriptural passages and in Smriti (17).--At
the unreality of the apparent manifoldness of the Self, caused by the limiting
adjuncts, aim those scriptural passages in which the Self is compared to the
sun, which remains one although his reflections on the surface of the water
are many (18).--Nor must the objection be raised that that comparison is unsuitable,
because the Self is not material like the sun, and there are no real upâdhis
separate from it as the water is from the sun; for the comparison merely means
to indicate that, as the reflected image of the sun participates in the changes,
increase, decrease, &c., which the water undergoes while the sun himself
remains unaffected thereby, so the true Self is not affected by the attributes
of the upâdhis, while, in so far as it is limited by the latter, it is
affected by them as it were (19, 20).--That the Self is within the upâdhis,
Scripture declares (21).
From the above explanation of this important adhikarana the one given
in the Srî-bhâshya differs totally. According to Râmânuga
the adhikarana raises the question whether the imperfections clinging
to the individual soul (the discussion of which has now come to an end) affect
also the highest Lord who, according to Scripture, abides within the soul as
antaryâmin. 'Notwithstanding the abode (of the highest Self within the
soul) (it is) not (affected by the soul's imperfections) because everywhere
(the highest Self is represented) as having twofold characteristics (viz. being,
on one hand, free from all evil, apahatapâpman, vigara, vimrityu,
&c., and, on the other hand, endowed with all auspicious qualities, satyakâma,
satyasamkalpa, &c.) (11).--Should it be objected that, just as the
soul although essentially free from evil--according to the Pragâpativâkya
in the Khandogya--yet is liable to imperfections owing to its connexion
with a variety of bodies, so the antaryâmin also is affected by abiding
within bodies; we deny this because in every section of the chapter referring
to the antaryâmin (in the Brihadâranyaka) he is expressly
called the Immortal, the ruler within; which shows him to be free from the shortcomings
of the giva (12).--Some, moreover, expressly assert that, although the
Lord and the soul are within one body, the soul only is imperfect, not the Lord
(dvâ suparnâ sayugâ sakhâyâ) (13).--Should
it be said that, according to the Khândogya, Brahman entered together
with the souls into the elements previously to the evolution of names and forms,
and hence participates in the latter, thus becoming implicated in the samsâra;
we reply that Brahman, although connected with such and such forms, is in itself
devoid of form, since it is the principal element (agent; pradhâna) in
the bringing about of names and forms (according to 'âkâso
ha vai nâmarûpayor nirvahitâ') (14).--But does not the passage
'satyam gñânam anantam brahma' teach that Brahman
is nothing but light (intelligence) without any difference, and does not the
passage 'neti neti' deny of it all qualities?--As in order, we reply, not to
deprive passages as the one quoted from the Taittirîya of their purport,
we admit that Brahman's nature is light, so we must also admit that Brahman
is satyasamkalpa, and so on; for if not, the passages in which those
qualities are asserted would become purportless (15).--Moreover the Taittirîya
passage only asserts so much, viz. the prakâsarûpatâ
of Brahman, and does not deny other qualities (16).--And the passage 'neti neti'
will be discussed later on.--The ubhayalingatva of Brahman in the sense
assigned above is asserted in many places Sruti and Smriti (17).--Because
Brahman although abiding in many places is not touched by their imperfections,
the similes of the reflected sun, of the ether limited by jars, &c., are
applicable to it (18).--Should it be said that the illustration is not an appropriate
one, because the sun is apprehended in the water erroneously only while the
antaryâmin really abides within all things, and therefore must be viewed
as sharing their defects (19); we reply that what the simile means to negative
is merely that Brahman should, owing to its inherence in many places, participate
in the increase, decrease, and so on, of its abodes. On this view both similes
are appropriate (20).--Analogous similes we observe to be employed in ordinary
life, as when we compare a man to a lion (21).
Sutras 22-30 constitute, according to Sankara, a new adhikarana (VI), whose object it is to show that the clause 'not so, not so' (neti neti; Brihadâr.) negatives, not Brahman itself, but only the two forms of Brahman described in the preceding part of the chapter. Sutras 23-26 further dwell on Brahman being in reality devoid of all distinctive attributes which are altogether due to the upâdhis. The last four Sutras return to the question how, Brahman being one only, the souls are in so many places spoken of as different from it, and, two explanatory hypotheses having been rejected, the conclusion is arrived at that all difference is unreal, due to fictitious limiting adjuncts.
According to Râmânuga, Sûtras 22 ff. continue the
discussion started in Sûtra 11. How, the question is asked, can the ubhayalingatva
of Brahman be maintained considering that the 'not so, not so' of the Brihadâranyaka
denies of Brahman all the previously mentioned modes (prakâra), so that
it can only be called that which is (sanmâtra)?--The reply given in Sutra
22 is that 'not so, not so' does not deny of Brahman the distinctive qualities
or modes declared previously (for it would be senseless at first to teach them,
and finally to deny them again), but merely denies the prâkritaitâvattva,
the previously stated limited nature of Brahman, i.e. it denies that Brahman
possesses only the previously mentioned qualifications. With this agrees, that
subsequently to 'neti neti' Scripture itself enunciates further qualifications
of Brahman. That Brahman as stated above is not the object of any other means
of proof but Scripture is confirmed in Sutra 23, 'Scripture declares Brahman
to be the non-manifest.'--And the intuition (sâkshâtkâra)
of Brahman ensues only upon its samrâdhana, i.e. upon its being
perfectly pleased by the worshipper's devotion, as Scripture and Smriti
declare (24).--That this interpretation of 'neti' is the right one, is likewise
shown by the fact that in the same way as prakâsa, luminousness,
gñâna, intelligence, &c., so also the quality of being
differentiated by the world (prapañkavsishtatâ) is
intuited as non-different, i.e. as likewise qualifying Brahman; and that prakâsa,
and so on, characterise Brahman, is known through repeated practice (on the
part of rishis like Vâmadeva) in the work of samrâdhana
mentioned before (25).--For all these reasons Brahman is connected with the
infinite, i.e. the infinite number of auspicious qualities; for thus the twofold
indications (linga) met with in Scripture are fully justified (26).--In
what relation, then, does the akid vastu, i.e. the non-sentient matter,
which, according to the brihadaranyaka, is one of the forms of
Brahman, stand to the latter?--Non-sentient beings might, in the first place,
be viewed as special arrangements (samsthanaviseshâh) of
Brahman, as the coils are of the body of the snake; for Brahman is designated
as both, i.e. sometimes as one with the world (Brahman is all this, &c.),
sometimes as different from it (Let me enter into those elements, &c.) (27).--Or,
in the second place, the relation of the two might be viewed as analogous to
that of light and the luminous object which are two and yet one, both being
fire (28).--Or, in the third place, the relation is like that stated before,
i.e. the material world is, like the individual souls (whose case was discussed
in II, 3, 43), a part--amsa--of Brahman (29, 30).
Adhik. VII (31-37) explains how some metaphorical expressions, seemingly implying that there is something different from Brahman, have to be truly understood.
Adhik. VIII (38-41) teaches that the reward of works is not, as Gaimini
opines, the independent result of the works acting through the so-called apûrva,
but is allotted by the Lord.
With the third pâda of the second adhyâya a new section of the
work begins, whose task it is to describe how the individual soul is enabled
by meditation on Brahman to obtain final release. The first point to be determined
here is what constitutes a meditation on Brahman, and, more particularly, in
what relation those parts of the Upanishads stand to each other which enjoin
identical or partly identical meditations. The reader of the Upanishads cannot
fail to observe that the texts of the different sâkhâs contain
many chapters of similar, often nearly identical, contents, and that in some
cases the text of even one and the same sâkhâ exhibits the
same matter in more or less varied forms. The reason of this clearly is that
the common stock of religious and philosophical ideas which were in circulation
at the time of the composition of the Upanishads found separate expression in
the different priestly communities; hence the same speculations, legends, &c.
reappear in various places of the sacred Scriptures in more or less differing
dress. Originally, when we may suppose the members of each Vedic school to have
confined themselves to the study of their own sacred texts, the fact that the
texts of other schools contained chapters of similar contents would hardly appear
to call for special note or comment; not any more than the circumstance that
the sacrificial performances enjoined on the followers of some particular sâkhâ
were found described with greater or smaller modifications in the books of other
sâkhâs also. But already at a very early period, at any rate
long before the composition of the Vedânta-sûtras in their present
form, the Vedic theologians must have apprehended the truth that, in whatever
regards sacrificial acts, one sâkhâ may indeed safely follow
its own texts, disregarding the texts of all other sâkhâs;
that, however, all texts which aim at throwing light on the nature of Brahman
and the relation to it of the human soul must somehow or other be combined into
one consistent systematical whole equally valid for the followers of all Vedic
schools. For, as we have had occasion to remark above, while acts may be performed
by different individuals in different ways, cognition is defined by the nature
of the object cognised, and hence can be one only, unless it ceases to be true
cognition. Hence the attempts, on the one hand, of discarding by skilful interpretation
all contradictions met with in the sacred text, and, on the other hand, of showing
what sections of the different Upanishads have to be viewed as teaching the
same matter, and therefore must be combined in one meditation. The latter is
the special task of the present pâda.
Adhik. I and II (1-4; 5) are concerned with the question whether those vidyâs,
which are met with in identical or similar form in more than one sacred text,
are to be considered as constituting several vidyâs, or one vidyâ
only. Sankara remarks that the question affects only those vidyâs
whose object is the qualified Brahman; for the knowledge of the non-qualified
Brahman, which is of an absolutely uniform nature, can of course be one only
wherever it is set forth. But things lie differently in those cases where the
object of knowledge is the sagunam brahma or some outward manifestation
of Brahman; for the qualities as well as manifestations of Brahman are many.
Anticipating the subject of a later adhikarana, we may take for an example
the so-called--Sândilyavidyâ which is met with in
Kh. Up. III, 14, again--in an abridged form--in Bri. Up. V, 6,
and, moreover, in the tenth book of the Satapatha-brâhmana
(X, 6, 3). The three passages enjoin a meditation on Brahman as possessing certain
attributes, some of which are specified in all the three texts (as, for instance,
manomayatva, bhârûpatva), while others are peculiar to each separate
passage (prânasarîratva and satyasamkalpatva,
for instance, being mentioned in the Khândogya Upanishad and Satapatha-brâhmana,
but not in the Brihadâranyaka Upanishad, which, on its part,
specifies sarvavasitva, not referred to in the two other texts). Here,
then, there is room for a doubt whether the three passages refer to one object
of knowledge or not. To the devout Vedântin the question is not a purely
theoretical one, but of immediate practical interest. For if the three texts
are to be held apart, there are three different meditations to be gone through;
if, on the other hand, the vidyâ is one only, all the different qualities
of Brahman mentioned in the three passages have to be combined into one meditation.--The
decision is here, as in all similar cases, in favour of the latter alternative.
A careful examination of the three passages shows that the object of meditation
is one only; hence the meditation also is one only, comprehending all the attributes
mentioned in the three texts.
Adhik. III (6-8) discusses the case of vidyâs being really separate, although apparently identical. The examples selected are the udgîthavidyâs of the Khândogya Upanishad (I, 1-3) and the Brihadâranyaka Upanishad (I, 3), which, although showing certain similarities--such as bearing the same name and the udgîtha being in both identified with prâna--yet are to be held apart, because the subject of the Khândogya vidyâ is not the whole udgîtha but only the sacred syllabic Om, while the Brihadâranyaka Upanishad represents the whole udgîtha as the object of meditation.
Sûtra 9 constitutes in Sankara's view a new adhikarana (IV), proving that in the passage, 'Let a man meditate' (Kh. Up. I, 1, 1), the Omkâra and the udgîtha stand in the relation of one specifying the other, the meaning being, 'Let a man meditate on that Omkâra which,' &c.--According to Râmânuga's interpretation, which seems to fall in more satisfactorily with the form and the wording of the Sûtra, the latter merely furnishes an additional argument for the conclusion arrived at in the preceding adhikarana.--Adhik. V (10) determines the unity of the so-called prâna-vidyâs and the consequent comprehension of the different qualities of the prâna, which are mentioned in the different texts, within one meditation.
Adhik. VI comprises, according to Sankara, the Sûtras 11-13.
The point to be settled is whether in all the meditations on Brahman all its
qualities are to be included or only those mentioned in the special vidyâ.
The decision is that the essential and unalterable attributes of Brahman, such
as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account everywhere, while those
which admit of a more or less (as, for instance, the attribute of having joy
for its head, mentioned in the Taitt. Up.) are confined to special meditations.--Adhik.
VII (14, 15), according to Sankara, aims at proving that the object
of Katha. Up. III, 10, 11 is one only, viz. to show that the highest
Self is higher than everything, so that the passage constitutes one vidyâ
only.--Adhik. VIII (16, 17) determines, according to Sankara,
that the Self spoken of in Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 1 is not a lower form of
the Self (the so-called sûtrâtman), but the highest Self; the discussion
of that point in this place being due to the wish to prove that the attributes
of the highest Self have to be comprehended in the Aitareyaka meditation.
According to Râmânuga the Sûtras 11-17 constitute
a single adhikarana whose subject is the same as that of Sankara's
sixth adhikarana. Sûtras 11-13 are, on the whole, explained as
by Sankara; Sûtra 12, however, is said to mean, 'Such attributes
as having joy for its head, &c. are not to be viewed as qualities of Brahman,
and therefore not to be included in every meditation; for if they were admitted
as qualities, difference would be introduced into Brahman's nature, and that
would involve a more or less on Brahman's part.' Sûtras 14-17 continue
the discussion of the passage about the priyasirastva.--If priyasirastva,
&c. are not to be viewed as real qualities of Brahman, for what purpose
does the text mention them?--'Because,' Sûtra 14 replies, 'there is no
other purpose, Scripture mentions them for the purpose of pious meditation.'--But
how is it known that the Self of delight is the highest Self? (owing to which
you maintain that having limbs, head, &c. cannot belong to it as attributes.)--'
Because,' Sûtra 15 replies, 'the term "Self" (âtmâ ânandamaya)
is applied to it.'--But in the previous parts of the chapter the term Self (in
âtmâ pranamaya, &c.) is applied to non-Selfs also; how
then do you know that in âtmâ ânandamaya it denotes the real
Self?--'The term Self,' Sûtra 16 replies, 'is employed here to denote
the highest Self as in many other passages (âtmâ vâ idam eka,
&c.), as we conclude from the subsequent passage, viz. he wished, 'May I
be many.'--But, an objection is raised, does not the context show that the term
'Self,' which in all the preceding clauses about the prânamaya,
&c. denoted something other than the Self, does the same in ânandamaya
âtman, and is not the context of greater weight than a subsequent passage?--To
this question asked in the former half of 17 (anvayâd iti ket)
the latter half replies, 'Still it denotes the Self, owing to the affirmatory
statement,' i.e. the fact of the highest Self having been affirmed in a previous
passage also, viz. II, 1, 'From that Self sprang ether.'
Adhik. IX (18) discusses a minor point connected with the prânasamvâda.--The subject of Adhik. X (19) has been indicated already above under Adhik. I.--Adhik. XI (20-22) treats of a case of a contrary nature; in Bri. Up. V, 5, Brahman is represented first as abiding in the sphere of the sun, and then as abiding within the eye; we therefore, in spite of certain counter-indications, have to do with two separate vidyâs.--Adhik. XII (23) refers to a similar case; certain attributes of Brahman mentioned in the Rânâya-nîya-khila have not to be introduced into the corresponding Khândogya vidyâ, because the stated difference of Brahman's abode involves difference of vidyâ.--Adhik. XIII (24) treats of another instance of two vidyâs having to be held apart.
Adhik. XIV (25) decides that certain detached mantras and brâhmana passages met with in the beginning of some Upanishads--as, for instance, a brâhmana about the mahâvrata ceremony at the beginning of the Aitareya-âranyaka--do, notwithstanding their position which seems to connect them with the brahmavidyâ, not belong to the latter, since they show unmistakable signs of being connected with sacrificial acts.
Adhik. XV (26) treats of the passages stating that the man dying in the possession of true knowledge shakes off all his good and evil deeds, and affirms that a statement, made in some of those passages only, to the effect that the good and evil deeds pass over to the friends and enemies of the deceased, is valid for all the passages.
Sûtras 27-30 constitute, according to Sankara, two adhikaranas
of which the former (XVI; 27, 28) decides that the shaking off of the good and
evil deeds takes place-not, as the Kaush. Up. states, on the road to Brahman's
world--but at the moment of the soul's departure from the body; the Kaushîtaki
statement is therefore not to be taken literally.--The latter adhikarana
(XVII; 29, 30) treats of the cognate question whether the soul that has freed
itself from its deeds proceeds in all cases on the road of the gods (as said
in the Kaush. Up.), or not. The decision is that he only whose knowledge does
not pass beyond the sagunam brahma proceeds on that road, while the soul
of him who knows the nirgunam brahma becomes one with it without moving
to any other place.
The Srî-bhâshya treats the four Sûtras as one adhikarana whose two first Sûtras are explained as by Sankara, while Sûtra 29 raises an objection to the conclusion arrived at, 'the going (of the soul on the path of the gods) has a sense only if the soul's freeing itself from its works takes place in both ways, i.e. partly at the moment of death, partly on the road to Brahman; for otherwise there would be a contradiction '(the contradiction being that, if the soul's works were all shaken off at the moment of death, the subtle body would likewise perish at that moment, and then the bodiless soul would be unable to proceed on the path of the gods). To this Sûtra 30 replies, 'The complete shaking off of the works at the moment of death is possible, since matters of that kind are observed in Scripture,' i. e. since scriptural passages show that even he whose works are entirely annihilated, and who has manifested himself in his true shape, is yet connected with some kind of body; compare the passage, 'param gyotir upasampadya svena rûpenabhinishpadyate sa tatra paryeti krîdan ramamânah sa svarâd bhavati tasya sarveshu lokeshu kâmakâro bhavati.' That subtle body is not due to karman, but to the soul's vidyâmâhâtmya.--That the explanation of the Srî-bhâshya agrees with the text as well as Sankara's, a comparison of the two will show; especially forced is Sankara's explanation of 'arthavattvam ubhayathâ,' which is said to mean that there is arthavattva in one case, and non-arthavattva in the other case.
The next Sûtra (31) constitutes an adhikarana (XVIII) deciding
that the road of the gods is followed not only by those knowing the vidyâs
which specially mention the going on that road, but by all who are acquainted
with the saguna-vidyâs of Brahman.--The explanation given in the
Srî-bhâshya (in which Sutras 31 and 32 have exchanged places)
is similar, with the difference however that all who meditate on Brahman--without
any reference to the distinction of nirguna and saguna--proceed
after death on the road of the gods. (The Srî-bhâshya reads
'sarveshâm,' i.e. all worshippers, not 'sarvâsâm,' all saguna-vidyâs.)
Adhik. XIX (32) decides that, although the general effect of true knowledge is release from all forms of body, yet even such beings as have reached perfect knowledge may retain a body for the purpose of discharging certain offices.--In the Srî-bhâshya, where the Sûtra follows immediately on Sûtra 30, the adhikarana determines, in close connexion with 30, that, although those who know Brahman as a rule divest themselves of the gross body--there remaining only a subtle body which enables them to move--and no longer experience pleasure and pain, yet certain beings, although having reached the cognition of Brahman, remain invested with a gross body, and hence liable to pleasure and pain until they have fully performed certain duties.
Adhik. XX (33) teaches that the negative attributes of Brahman mentioned in
some vidyâs--such as its being not gross, not subtle, &c.--are to
be included in all meditations on Brahman.--Adhik. XXI (34) determines that
Kâtha Up. III, 1, and Mu. Up. III, 1, constitute one vidyâ
only, because both passages refer to the highest Brahman. According to Râmânuga
the Sûtra contains a reply to an objection raised against the conclusion
arrived at in the preceding Sûtra.--Adhik. XXII (35, 36) maintains that
the two passages, Bri. Up. III, 4 and III, 5, constitute one vidyâ
only, the object of knowledge being in both cases Brahman viewed as the inner
Self of all.--Adhik. XXIII (37) on the contrary decides that the passage Ait.
Âr. II, 2, 4, 6 constitutes not one but two meditations.--Adhik. XXIV
(38) again determines that the vidyâ of the True contained in Bri.
Up. V, 4, 5, is one only--According to Râmânuga,Sûtras
35-38 constitute one adhikarana only whose subject is the same as that
of XXII according to Sankara.
Adhik. XXV (39) proves that the passages Kh. Up. VIII, 1 and Bri.
Up. IV, 4, 22 cannot constitute one vidyâ, since the former refers to
Brahman as possessing qualities, while the latter is concerned with Brahman
as destitute of qualities.--Adhik. XXVI (40, 41) treats, according to Sankara,
of a minor question connected with Kh. Up. V, 11 ff.--According to the
Srî-bhâshya, Sûtras 39-41 form one adhikarana
whose first Sûtra reaches essentially the same conclusion as Sankara
under 39. Sûtras 40, 41 thereupon discuss a general question concerning
the meditations on Brahman. The qualities, an opponent is supposed to remark,
which in the two passages discussed are predicated of Brahman--such as vasitva,
satyakâmatva, &c.--cannot be considered real (pâramârthika),
since other passages (sa esha neti neti, and the like) declare Brahman
to be devoid of all qualities. Hence those qualities cannot be admitted into
meditations whose purpose is final release.--To this objection Sûtra 40
replies,'(Those qualities) are not to be left off (from the meditations on Brahman),
since (in the passage under discussion as well as in other passages) they are
stated with emphasis'--But, another objection is raised, Scripture says that
he who meditates on Brahman as satyakâma, &c. obtains a mere perishable
reward, viz. the world of the fathers, and similar results specified in Kh.
Up. VIII, 2; hence, he who is desirous of final release, must not include those
qualities of Brahman in his meditation.--To this objection Sûtra 41 replies,
'Because that (i. e. the free roaming in all the worlds, the world of the fathers,
&c.) is stated as proceeding therefrom (i. e. the approach to Brahman which
is final release) in the case of (the soul) which has approached Brahman;' (therefore
a person desirous of release, may include satyakâmatva, &c. in his
Adhik. XXVII (42) decides that those meditations which are connected with certain
matters forming constituent parts of sacrificial actions, are not to be considered
as permanently requisite parts of the latter.--Adhik. XXVIII (43) teaches that,
in a Bri. Up. passage and a similar Kh. Up. passage, Vâyu
and Prâna are not to be identified, but to be held apart.--Adhik.
XXIX (44-52) decides that the fire-altars made of mind, &c., which are mentioned
in the Agnirahasya, do not constitute parts of the sacrificial action (so that
the mental, &c. construction of the altar could optionally be substituted
for the actual one), but merely subjects of meditations.
Adhik. XXX (53,54) treats, according to Sankara, in the way of
digression, of the question whether to the Self an existence independent of
the body can be assigned, or not (as the Materialists maintain).--According
to the Srî-bhâshya the adhikarana does not refer to
this wide question, but is concerned with a point more immediately connected
with the meditations on Brahman, viz. the question as to the form under which,
in those meditations, the Self of the meditating devotee has to be viewed. The
two Sûtras then have to be translated as follows: 'Some (maintain that
the soul of the devotee has, in meditations, to be viewed as possessing those
attributes only which belong to it in its embodied state, such as gñâtritva
and the like), because the Self is (at the time of meditation) in the body.'--The
next Sûtra rejects this view, 'This is not so, but the separatedness (i.
e. the pure isolated state in which the Self is at the time of final release
when it is freed from all evil, &c.) (is to be transferred to the meditating
Self), because that will be the state (of the Self in the condition of final
Adhik. XXXI (55, 56) decides that meditations connected with constituent elements
of the sacrifice, such as the udgîtha, are, in spite of difference of
svara in the udgîtha, &c., valid, not only for that sâkhâ
in which the meditation actually is met with, but for all sâkhâs.--Adhik.
XXXII (57) decides that the Vaisvânara Agni of Kh. Up. V,
II ff. is to be meditated upon as a whole, not in his single parts.--Adhik.
XXXIII (58) teaches that those meditations which refer to one subject, but as
distinguished by different qualities, have to be held apart as different meditations.
Thus the daharavidyâ, Sândilyavidyâ, &c.
Adhik. XXXIV (59) teaches that those meditations on Brahman for which the texts assign one and the same fruit are optional, there being no reason for their being cumulated.--Adhik. XXXV (60) decides that those meditations, on the other hand, which refer to special wishes may be cumulated or optionally employed according to choice.--Adhik. XXXVI (61-66) extends this conclusion to the meditations connected with constituent elements of action, such as the udgîtha.
Adhik. I (1-17) proves that the knowledge of Brahman is not kratvartha, i.e.
subordinate to action, but independent.--Adhik. II (18-20) confirms this conclusion
by showing that the state of the pravrâgins is enjoined by the
sacred law, and that for them vidyâ only is prescribed, not action.--Adhik.
III (21,22) decides that certain clauses forming part of vidyâs are not
mere stutis (arthavâdas), but themselves enjoin the meditation.--The legends
recorded in the Vedânta-texts are not to be used as subordinate members
of acts, but have the purpose of glorifying--as arthavâdas--the injunctions
with which they are connected (Adhik. IV, 23, 24).--For all these reasons the
ûrdhvaretasah require no actions but only knowledge (Adhik. V,
25).--Nevertheless the actions enjoined by Scripture, such as sacrifices, conduct
of certain kinds, &c., are required as conducive to the rise of vidyâ
in the mind (Adhik. VI, 26, 27).--Certain relaxations, allowed by Scripture,
of the laws regarding food, are meant only for cases of extreme need (Adhik.
VII, 28-3l).--The âsramakarmâni are obligatory on
him also who does not strive after mukti (Adhik. VIII, 32-35).--Those also who,
owing to poverty and so on, are anâsrama have claims to vidyâ
(Adhik. IX, 36-39).--An ûrdhvaretas cannot revoke his vow (Adhik. X, 40).--Expiation
of the fall of an ûrdhvaretas (Adhik. XI, 41, 42).--Exclusion of the fallen
ûrdhvaretas in certain cases (Adhik. XII, 43).--Those meditations, which
are connected with subordinate members of the sacrifice, are the business of
the priest, not of the yagamâna (Adhik. XIII, 44-46).--Bri.
Up. III, 5, 1 enjoins mauna as a third in addition to bâlya and pânditya
(Adhik. XIV, 47-49).--By bâlya is to be understood a childlike innocent
state of mind (Adhik. XV, 50).
Sûtras 51 and 52 discuss, according to Râmânuga, the question when the vidyâ, which is the result of the means described in III, 4, arises. Sûtra 51 treats of that vidyâ whose result is mere exaltation (abhyudaya), and states that 'it takes place in the present life, if there is not present an obstacle in the form of a prabalakarmântara (in which latter case the vidyâ arises later only), on account of Scripture declaring this (in various passages).'--Sûtra 52, 'Thus there is also absence of a definite rule as to (the time of origination of) that knowledge whose fruit is release, it being averred concerning that one also that it is in the same condition (i.e. of sometimes having an obstacle, sometimes not).--Sankara, who treats the two Sûtras as two adhikaranas, agrees as to the explanation of 51, while, putting a somewhat forced interpretation on 52, he makes it out to mean that a more or less is possible only in the case of the saguna-vidyâs.